Sheryl Smith v. Andrew Whelan by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-7-2014 
Sheryl Smith v. Andrew Whelan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Sheryl Smith v. Andrew Whelan" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 475. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/475 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3167  
_____________ 
 
SHERYL SMITH, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW MCGILL WHELAN 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-01188) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2014 
 
Before:    CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  May 7, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge 
 
 Sheryl Smith appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant-appellee Andrew McGill Whelan, her former boyfriend, on claims of 
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negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation arising from his transmission of genital herpes 
(“HSV-2”) to her.  The District Court determined that Smith’s suit, brought more than 
three years after Smith was diagnosed with HSV-2, was barred by the relevant Delaware 
statutes of limitations.  Smith argues that there are genuine disputes of facts material to 
whether Whelan’s conduct throughout their relationship constituted fraudulent 
concealment of his tortious conduct, precluding summary adjudication of the limitations 
question.  We disagree, and will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recount only those facts 
necessary to our analysis.   
 Smith and Whelan began dating in May 2008 and had unprotected sexual 
intercourse for the first time on May 3, 2008.  Smith alleges that Whelan was aware at the 
time that he was a carrier of HSV-2, but did not inform her prior to their sexual contact.  
Smith testified at her deposition that she requested that Whelan use a condom during 
sexual intercourse following their second date on May 14, 2008.  In response, Whelan 
informed her that he was sterile and there was therefore “no reason” for them to use a 
condom.  App. 269.  
 On October 10, 2008, when the two were still dating, Smith’s gynecologist 
informed her that she had tested positive for HSV-2.  Smith asked her gynecologist 
whether he believed Whelan had given it to her, as she “hadn’t had sex with anybody in a 
really long time except for [Whelan].”  App. 303-04.  Her gynecologist informed her that 
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it was possible.  Smith acknowledged at her deposition that, following the diagnosis, she 
had recognized “[l]ogically” that Whelan was “the only person I’ve slept with for years; 
so obviously that’s where this came from,” but testified that she also “was so distraught 
that I didn’t know who or what to think of or to suspect.”  App. 304.   
 Smith told Whelan of her HSV-2 diagnosis later the same day.  Smith testified that 
Whelan reacted compassionately to the news, telling her that “he didn’t care, that it didn’t 
matter to him, that he still loved me, thought I was beautiful, gave me hugs and kisses 
and was very tender and very supportive.”  App. 309.  Whelan also told Smith that he 
“wasn’t sick,” and that “everything was okay with him,” which Smith took to mean that 
Whelan did not have HSV-2 and thus could not have been responsible for transmitting it 
to her.  Id.  Smith testified that, despite her suspicions that Whelan may have transmitted 
the disease to her, she “didn’t want to come out and straight out accuse him without 
knowing for sure that that’s the truth.”  App. 304.    
 Following her diagnosis, Smith suggested that the two refrain from sexual contact 
during periods when Smith was undergoing a herpes-related flare-up, in order to prevent 
Whelan from contracting the virus.  Because of Whelan’s acquiescence in this pattern of 
conduct and his failure to disclose that he had been infected with HSV-2 himself prior to 
sexual contact with Smith, Smith inferred that Whelan was not the source of her 
infection.   
 Smith testified that, over a year and a half later, on June 20, 2010, Whelan 
accidentally let slip that he had “been dealing with [HSV-2] for a long time.”  App. 331.  
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When pressed about his offhand comment, Whelan admitted to Smith that he had been 
aware that he had HSV-2 since college, several decades prior to the beginning of their 
relationship.  Three months later, in September of 2010, Whelan and Smith separated.  
Smith brought this action on December 1, 2011.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of a 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 
252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 Under Delaware law, personal injury actions are governed by a two-year statute of 
limitations.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8119 (West); Cole v. Delaware League for Planned 
Parenthood, Inc., 530 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 1987) (“Section 8119 . . . applies to all 
claims for personal injury, without exception, and regardless of the theoretical basis 
underlying the requested remedy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Fraud and 
misrepresentation actions are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 10, § 8106 (West); Krahmer v. Christie’s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. Ch. 
2006).   
“In addressing when an action is time-barred, a necessary first step in the analysis 
is determining the time when the action accrued.”  U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of Allentown v. 
Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. 1996).   Under Delaware law, “[a] 
cause of action in tort accrues at the time of injury.”  Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, 
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Inc., 603 A.2d 831, 834 (Del. 1992).  The District Court concluded that Smith’s causes of 
action accrued at the time of her diagnosis on October 10, 2008, and Smith does not 
contest this conclusion.  Accordingly, we shall use October 10, 2008 as the date when 
Smith’s causes of action accrued.  
 “Even after a cause of action accrues, the running of the limitations period can be 
tolled in certain limited circumstances.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 
A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).  Under Delaware law, a 
defendant’s “fraudulent concealment” may toll the running of the statute of limitations 
until a plaintiff’s “rights are discovered or could have been discovered by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.”  Giordano v. Czerwinski, 216 A.2d 874, 876 (Del. 1966).  Smith 
urges that Whelan’s conduct from the date of her diagnosis on October 10, 2008 through 
June 20, 2010, the date on which Whelan accidentally disclosed to her that he had been 
dealing with HSV-2 “for a long time,” constituted fraudulent concealment of his tortious 
conduct, which should toll the running of the statute of limitations.    
 For a statute of limitations to be tolled due to a defendant’s fraudulent 
concealment, “[f]irst it must be shown that there is sufficient evidence from which a 
judge or jury can find that facts were fraudulently concealed.”  Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 
mbH v. Hercules, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 247, 253 (D. Del. 1990).  Once a claimant 
demonstrates that the defendant engaged in “an affirmative act” of fraudulent 
concealment, the court turns to the question of “when the injured party did discover or 
should have discovered the injury . . . so that the time for the statute of limitations to 
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begin running can be set.”  Id.  “[W]hile the Statute of Limitations may not apply when 
the acts complained of are fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff, such application is 
suspended only until his rights are discovered or could have been discovered by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.”  Giordano, 216 A.2d at 876.   
 Accepting Smith’s allegations as true, Whelan’s deceptive conduct throughout his 
relationship with Smith may have constituted a pattern of fraudulent concealment of his 
alleged tortious conduct.  Nevertheless, the fact that Whelan may have concealed his 
alleged tortious conduct does not itself mean that the running of the statute of limitations 
was tolled for the duration of his fraudulent concealment.  The District Court correctly 
applied Delaware law by also analyzing whether Whelan’s pattern of obfuscation would 
have been sufficient to disturb Smith’s inquiry notice of the source of her injury.  “[A] 
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the statute was tolled, and relief from the 
statute extends only until the plaintiff is put on inquiry notice.”  In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 
919 A.2d 563, 585 (Del. Ch. 2007).   Because inquiry notice exists as soon as a plaintiff’s 
rights “could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence,” the date at 
which a plaintiff in fact becomes subjectively aware of the source of his or her injury is 
not determinative.  Krahmer v. Christie’s Inc., 911 A.2d 399, 407 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 We agree with the District Court that Smith was on inquiry notice that Whelan 
was the likely source of her injury at the time of her diagnosis on October 10, 2008.1   
The sexually-transmitted nature of the injury, taken together with Smith’s testimony that 
she had not engaged in sexual contact with anyone besides Whelan in the two years 
leading up to her diagnosis, provided Smith with sufficient information to alert her that 
Whelan was the most likely source of her injury.   
 We recognize that at the time of her diagnosis, it may have been difficult for Smith 
to acknowledge that Whelan was the most likely source of her infection, especially in 
light of their romantic relationship and Whelan’s deceptive conduct.  Smith testified that 
she “logically” recognized at the time that Whelan was “obviously [] where this came 
from” as he was the “only person I’ve slept with for years.”  App. 304.  Still, she 
professed simultaneously holding the belief that the virus may have been transmitted to 
her from a sexual partner years prior, but was just then beginning to manifest symptoms.  
                                              
1 As the District Court observed, this case presents a somewhat unusual claim for 
fraudulent concealment, as Smith was aware of her injury, but not the source of that 
injury, during the period she argues the statute should have been tolled.  This represents a 
departure from much of the Delaware case law on fraudulent concealment, which 
addresses situations where a plaintiff alleges that, during the tolling period, they had not 
yet realized they had been injured at all.  See, e.g., Krahmer, 911 A.2d at 403 (plaintiffs 
had been unaware during proposed tolling period that the painting they had purchased 
from defendant auction house was a forgery); Shockley,  456 A.2d 798 (Del. 1983) 
(plaintiff had been unaware during proposed tolling period that her ovaries had been 
removed in surgery by defendant doctor).  Like the District Court, we assume fraudulent 
concealment may toll a statute of limitations for a plaintiff who is aware of his or her 
injury, so long as that concealment would have prevented the plaintiff from learning the 
source of his or her injury, even with the exercise of due diligence.   
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Regardless of Smith’s subjective ambivalence about the source of her injury following 
her diagnosis, Delaware law directs us to focus on the objective question of whether the 
source of an injury “could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”  
Giordano, 216 A.2d at 876.  We believe that Smith had all the information necessary to 
put her on inquiry notice that Whelan likely had infected her as of October 10, 2008.   
 Although Smith’s subjective knowledge is not determinative, our conclusion is 
reinforced by evidence in the record that Smith suspected Whelan as the source.  Upon 
being diagnosed, Smith immediately asked her gynecologist whether he believed that 
Whelan was responsible for infecting her.  On October 28, 2008, weeks after Whelan had 
denied being sick, Smith confided in her psychiatric nurse that she thought Whelan might 
be withholding information from her about whether he had infected her.  That Smith 
subjectively harbored such suspicions, even in the face of Whelan’s deceptive conduct, 
only buttresses our conclusion that the facts known to her at the time of her diagnosis put 
her on inquiry notice that Whelan was the likely source of her injury.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the ground that Smith’s claims are time-barred under Delaware law.   
